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RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING-TRUSTS--STATUTORY "DOUBLE LIABILITY" WHERE
IN TRUST FOR INFANTS-Defendants held state bank stock,
along with other property, in trust for their minor children. The bank became
insolvent and suit was brought against the trustees to enforce "double liability"
under the state statute.1 The lower court held that the trustees were not personally liable, but that the estates were subject to the statutory liability. An
appeal was taken on the latter point. Held, that the trust estate was not liable,
since the statutory liability was contractual, requiring an assent which the beneficiaries, being minors, were incapable of giving. Rutledge v. Stackley, 16o S.E.
429 (S.C. 193).
Under statutes imposing "double liability" 2 upon the stockholders of state 3
and national 4 banks, the trustee, being the legal owner of the stock, is usually
held personally liable.5 The cestui que trust is under no direct obligation to
the corporation or its creditors, and the trust estate is involved only to the
extent of the right of the trustee to reimbursement or exoneration." To avoid
this circuity of action and to remove this apparent hardship upon the trustee,
federal-, and many state statutes " relieve the trustee of this personal liability
and impose it upon the trust estate or funds in his hands.9 In the instant case,
however, there was apparently no statute making the trust estate liable, and
since it was conceded that the trustee was not personally liable, the immunity
of the trust estate might well have been based on the ground that the trustee
was entitled to no exoneration. But the court, in its zeal to foster the interests
of infants, went further and declared that the estate was not liable, because the
liability was contractual, requiring an assent which the minor beneficiaries were
incapable of giving. This reasoning seems unsound. The beneficiaries,10 not
being the legal owners of the stock and not being parties to the contract, are
not required to assent." Again, under this reasoning, carried to its logical
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0BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927) § 219: "As a general rule, in the case of banking corporations, the liability imposed upon stockholders . . . is for an amount equal to
the nominal or par value of their stock in addition to what may have been paid or due therefor . . . In other words, it imposes what is called a 'double liability'."
'Ibid. §218.
438 STAT. 273 (1915), 12 U. S. C. 64 (1928).
5I Cooic, CoRPoRATIONS (8th ed., 1923) §§ 245, 246; I MACHEN, CORPORATIONS (i908)
767., Mitchells Case, 9 Eq. 363 (Eng., 1884) ; see Morse v. Pac. Ry. Co., 93 Ill. App. 33,
37 (19oo) ; CooK, op. cit. supra note 5; Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of
28 HARV. L. REV. 725; Note (1930) 79 U. OF PA.L. REv. 623.
Trust
7 Estates (915),
U. S. REV. STATS. § 5152, 12 U. S. C. 66 (1928) ; Williams v. Cobb, 242 U. S.307, 37
Sup. Ct. 115 (1916).
' Smathers v. Carolina Savings Bank, 155 N. C. 283, 71 S. E. 345 (I9I). For the
statutory exemption of trustees of corporate stock generally, see LORING, TRUSTEes'S HANDBooK (3d ed. i9o7) 27. A few states by statute extend liability to the "equitable owner",
See 6 FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
Madison v. Bryan, 31 N. M. 404, 247 Pac. 275 (1926).
§ 4185.
CORPORATIONS (1919)
I The representative capacity of the trustee must appear upon the books of the bank:
Kent v. Urie, 86 Md. 72, 37 Atl. 789 (1897) ; but if it does, it is immaterial that the beneficiary is a minor, McNair v. Darragh, 31 F. (2d) 9o6 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929) ; or that the
trust estate has been dissolved, Fowler v. Gowing, 152 Fed. 8oi (N. D. N. Y. 1907).
"Supra note 6.
"The court was influenced by the analogy to the transfer of ownership to minors.
But there the infant is a party to the transaction, is the legal owner with the additional
privilege of avoiding the transaction. CooK, op. cit. supra note 5, § 250. In the trust case,

(446)
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conclusion, the trustee would never be entitled to reimbursement for contractual
expenditures, no matter how properly made, unless the beneficiary, on coming
of age, affirmed the action.12 But whatever the basis for the decision, a state
of the law in which the trustee is relieved of liability without a definite statutory
provision making the trust estate liable is anomalous indeed, and one that is
scarcely adequate for the protection of depositors.1 3

BILLS

NOTES-BANKS

BANKING-HoLDER IN DUE COURSE UNBANK ACQUIRING ANOTHER BANK'S ASSETS
AND LIABILITES-Plaintiff bank assumed the assets and liabilities of another
bank. It was indemnified by a bond against loss, and any surplus assets were
to be returned to the defunct bank. In an action on a note included among the
assets, and generally indorsed to the plaintiff at the time of the transfer, the
trial court refused to allow the defendant to show lack of consideration. Held,
that the plaintiff was subject to the defense since it was not a holder in due
course under section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Baach v. Bank of
DER

AND

N. I. L. § 52-STATUS

AND

OF

Pocahontas, 16o S. E. 68 (Va. 1931).

The agreement between the banks suggests a transfer of assets for a particular purpose-liquidation and settlement of claims.' The contract, however,
did not form part of the indorsement so as to make it restrictive, 2 because the
entire indorsement must be on the noti itself or a paper attached thereto.8
Therefore, the plaintiff could not be limited to the rights of a restrictive indorsee. 4 The equities, then, would be barred unless the plaintiff was not a
holder in due course." The court decided that the plaintiff did not come within
section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, without indicating which provision was offended. The requirement of value is the only one which can
properly be disputed, 6 and the court correctly decided that value 7 was given.
The assumption of liabilities at the request of the other party, even though
secured by a bond, is unquestionably a detriment and a sufficient consideration
the trustee is the legal owner, and the infant is not a party to the transaction. McNair v.
Darragh, .upra note io. "
Moreover, it is not necessary, as the court seems to think, to designate the liability
as contractual rather than statutory in order to relieve the infant from liability. The federal courts, which consistently declare the liability to be statutory and not contractual, refuse
to hold an infant owner of stock liable. Early v. Richardson, 280 U. S. 496, 50 Sup. Ct.
176 (1929); (1930) 43 HARv. L. Rnv. 1150.
' The courts do not deny the trustee a right to reimbursement for expenditures properly made where the beneficiary happens to be a minor. Willis v. Sharp, 113 N. Y. 586
(1889); Moore v. McFall, 263 Ill. 596, IO5 N. E. 723 (914).

No appeal was taken as to the trustees' not being personally liable, and no reason
is given for it, or the necessity of putting the immunity of the trust estate on the ground
of no assent. The court may possibly have been misled by the many decisions on national
bank stock which are decided under an express statute, mpra note 7.
See Bank of Tallassee v. Jordan, 2oo Ala. 182, 184, 75 So. 930, 932 (1917).
"Under N. I. L. § 36, an indorsement is restrictive which constitutes the indorsee the
agent of the indorser or vests title in the indorsee in trust for or to the use of some other
person.
* N. I. L. § 31. The allonge must be physically attached. Commercial Security Co. v.
Main Street Pharmacy, 174 N. C. 655, 94 S. E. 298 (1917). But see infra note 15.
'N. I. L. § 37 (2) gives a restrictive indorsee the right to bring any action that the
indorser could bring. But cf. infra note 14.
"N. I. L. §57.
'The defendant indorsed as an officer of the payee corporation, rather than in his
individual capacity, but did not so indicate. Questions of good faith and notice must be
resolved in favor of the plaintiff, especially in view of N. I. L. § 17 (6). "Where a signature is so placed . . . that it is not clear in what capacity the person . . . intended to
sign, he is to be deemed an indorser."
s N. I. L. § 25. "Value in any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract."
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for the transfer.8 The technique of not specifying the fault 9 enabled the court
to avoid saying that although section 52 was satisfied, something further was
required to constitute the plaintiff a holder in due course '--namely, that the
plaintiff sue in his own interest, or at least in the interest of someone other than
the one against whom the defendant claims the equity.1 It does not follow
that because the transfer was for value, the plaintiff became invested with the
general unrestricted property in the assets. The obvious purpose of the contract was to constitute the plaintiff a receiver of the assets for the benefit of
the creditors. Consequently, it should be accorded the legal status of a receiver 12
and not that of an unconditional purchaser. 13 The conclusion that section 52
by enumerating certain requirements dbes not exclude all others is not at all
revolutionary. Similar treatment has been accorded other sections.' 4 The
suggested construction is clearly distinguishable from a flagrant disregard of
the statute,' 5 and might well have been used by the court to rationalize its
decision.
8

Commercial National Bank of Washington v. McCandlish, 23 F. (2d) 986 (Ct. of App.

D. C.

1928).

' Cf. other techniques used to achieve this result:
In Paulson v. Boyd, 137 Wis. 241, II8 N. W. 841 (i9o8), the assumption of liabilities

was held to mean an express assumption of all defenses to which the notes were subject
in the hands of the former owner. This construction is absurd. As pointed out in the

dissenting opinion at 255, 118 N. W. at 845, the term liabilities refers to the general in-

debtedness carried on the books of the concern.
In Bank of Tallassee, supra note x, the court held that the contract made the indorsement restrictive, and therefore the plaintiff was limited to the rights of his indorser. But
see infra note I5.
Although § 54 might seem applicable, by analogy to cases of banks extending credit on
deposited negotiable paper (see BRANNAN," NE rIABLE INsTUMNT& LAw (4th ed., 1926)
411, 412), it should be noted that the circuity of action which that section seeks to avoid is'

not present in this situation.

Furthermore, failure to recover on this note would not

amount to failure of consideration on part of the defunct bank since substantial performance
is derived from the other assets and the additional considerations of the bond, maintenance
of the financial stability of the community, and new business which the plaintiff would
acquire.
I Perhaps the court was reluctant to take this step because it would necessitate considerable modification of the broad statement it made in Trustees of American Bank of
Orange v. McComb, IO5 Va. 473, 54 S. E. 14 (i9o6), where a failing bank converted its
property into a trust for creditors. The court held that the trustee was "undoubtedly" a
holder in due course under the N. I. L. since it fulfilled'all the requirements of § 52 and
did not come within § 53, which the court designated as the only exception to § 52.
' The latter provision is added to accommodate such cases as Trustees of American
Bank of Orange v. McComb, supra note io.
'2A
receiver appointed to liquidate a bank's affairs holds no better title than did the
bank. Farmers' and Merchants' State Bank v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 13 Sup. Ct. 148
(1892) ; Williams v. Johnson, 5o Mont. 7, 144 Pac. 768 (1914). But cf. Trustees of American Bank of Orange v. McComb, supra note io.
' A bank which acquires negotiable paper by purchase from another bank is a holder
in due course. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank of Wellsburg v. Nissen, 46 S. D. 121, 190
N. W. 1014 (1922).
' Thus, § 2 (3), referring to installment notes, has been applied to non-installment notes,
Arnett v. Clack, 22 Ariz. 4o9, i98 Pac. 127 (I92i) ; and also to a series of notes payable
at different times, White v. Hatcher, 135 Tenn. 6og, i88 S. W. 61 (915).
Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, 217 Mass. 462, 105 N. E. 6o5 (1914), holds that there
are other ways of negotiating paper than are specified in the first sentence of § 30 which
provides for negotiation by delivery or indorsement.
It has been held that the rights enunerated in § 37 are not exhaustive. Atlantic City
National Bank v. Commercial Lumber Co., 155 Atl. 762 (N. J., 1931).

Similarly, the rights of a holder in due course described in § 57 may be available to
one not a holder in due course. Burnes v. New Mineral Fertilizer Co., 218 Mass. 300, io5
N. E. 1074 (14).

§ 65 lists four warranties, to which Hoge v. Ward, i55 S. E. 644 (W. Va. 1930)
adds a fifth-that the indorser has done and will do nothing to prevent collection thereof.
'A
note with a definite maturity date, but accellerable at the option of the holder is
clearly within § 4 (2), yet is generally held non-negotiable. Holliday State Bank v. Hoff-

RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAws--ToRTs----JoINDER OF DEFENDANTS-A stream travers-

ing plaintiff's ranch in Kansas was polluted by three defendants, each acting
independently of the other. Under Kansas law plaintiff may recover a judgment for the total wrong in a joint suit against the three defendants. By the

law of Missouri each defendant must be sued severally, and is liable only to the
extent of the injury committed by his wrong. Plaintiff sued these three defendants in one suit in Missouri. Defendant contended there was a misjoinder
of parties. Held, that plaintiff could join these defendants since the law of
Kansas governed. Mosby v. Mailhattan Oil CO., 52 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A.
8th, 193).
Although the lex loci delicti governs the existence of a cause of action in2
locus.
tort,' courts of the forum will adopt only the substantive tort law of the

Is, then, the right granted to plaintiff by the law of Kansas substantive or procedural law of that state? The law of the forum determines who may and who
must sue and be sued, 3 and the order in which parties who are liable shall be
sued.4 But, it would seem, these latter principles may be applied only where
the extent of the liability of the defendant is the same in both states, since,
where such is the case, the problem is properly only a question of procedure.'
In the instant case, however, although the measure of damages is the same in
each state," the extent to which each defendant is liable differs because in Kansas
these acts are deemed a joint tort, in Missouri, a several tort. Since extent of
liability is substantive, 7 the Missouri court was correct in applying the Kansas
law and treating this tort as joint," thereby imposing full liability on each de9
fendant and allowing them to be sued in one action. It might be argued that
of substance, i. e., a full
one
of
consists
fthe right gained in the lex loci actually
judgment against all three defendants; and one of procedure, i. e., a right to
man, 85 Kan. 71, 116 Pac. 239 (191I) ; Western Farquhar Machinery Co. v. Burnett, 82 Ore.
174, 161 Pac. 384 (1916).
Again, § 31 requires the indorsement to be on the instrument itself or a paper attached

thereto. But it has been held that an accompanying contract or letter may form part of
the indorsement. Bank of Tallassee v. Jordan, supra note I; Bank of America v. Waydell, 187 N. Y. 115, 79 N. E. 857 (1907).
Such patent non-conformity to the statute differs essentially from the interpretations
of descriptive sections mentioned supra note 14.
CONFLICT OF LAws .(1927) 188.
'Lauria v. Du Pont, 241 Fed. 687 (E: D. N. Y. 1917); American Ry. Express Co. v.
Davis, 152 Ark. 258, 238 S. W. 50 (1922); GOODRICH, ibid. at 158; WESTLAKE, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1925) § 341.
'CONFLICT OF LAWS REST'ATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1931) § 637; Fryklund v. Great Northern Ry. Co., ioi Minn. 37, II1 N. W. 727 (io7), In this case three defendant railroads
were jointly liable to plaintiff. He had been injured in Montana and brought suit in Minnesota. A Minnesota statute provided that all parties to a joint obligation shall be severally
liable for the full amount. The court enforced the statute on the ground that the lex fori
governs as to the remedy. This case may be distinguished from the instant case in that a
joint obligation was admitted by the laws of both states. As to how that obligation shall be
enforced is clearly procedural.
'Taft v. Ward, io6 Mass. SiS (1871) ; GOODRICH, op cit. supra note I, at i6o.
'See Fryklund v. Great Northern Ry. Co., supra note 3.
' Compensatory damages for the wrong suffered are allowed in both states. See GooDRicH, op. cit. supra note I, at 182; (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 127.
7
Slater v. Mexican National R. Co., 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581; Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Phillips, 298 S. V. 325 (Ark. 1927) ; MINOR, CONFTIC£T OF LAws (igoi) § 194;
.cf. Sherman v. Gassett, 9 Ill. 521 (1847).
'Kansas City v. Slangstrom, 53 Kan. 431, 36 Pac. 7o6 (1894) ; McDaniel v. City of
Cherryvale, 9i Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 8gg (1913).
'Benson v. City of St. Louis, 219 S. W. 57.5 (Mo. 192o) ; Martinowsky v. City of Hannibal, 35 Mo. App. 70 (1889).

IGOODRICH,
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join all three defendants in one suit. 10 Under such a view Missouri would adopt
the former only, and require the plaintiff to sue each defendant severally, giving
him a judgment against each for the full amount of the plaintiff's damage."
This, however, would seem a hypercritical and non-practical criticism.' 2 The
decision reached by the court is to be highly commended as a judicious solution
of a difficult situation arising in the chaos of substance and procedure.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTOXICATING LIQUORS-RIGHT OF A DEPENDENT
TO RECOVER ACTUAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN A STATE COURT UNDER
THE VOLSTEAD AcT-The dependents of Wheeler brought suit in the State

Superior Court for actual and exemplary damages under the Volstead Act ' for
loss of support due to his addiction to the. use of liquor, furnished him by the
defendant company while in its employ. The company applied for a writ of
prohibition to the Superior Court on the ground that the cause should be tried
by the Industrial Accident Commission. Held, that the petition should be
denied. Shell Oil Co. v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles, 2 P. (2d) 8O
(Cal. 1931).

The purpose of the Eighteenth Amendment is to suppress the use of
intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. 2 By virtue of the Amendment8
and the "implied" powers clause of the Constitution,4 Congress has within its
discretion the power to enact all laws appropriate for the enforcement of the
constitutional provisions.5 The section of the Volstead Act in question, fashioned after some similar state legislation," has for its purpose the better enforcement of the Amendment and thus is constitutional.7 It tends to suppress the
liquor traffic because it subjects those unlawfully furnishing liquor to severe
liabilities by affording protection to dependents who have been injured by the
loss of support through unlawful sales, or furnishing liquor to those who were
the source of support. Since cases in which cars have been confiscated for
" In joint torts each wrongdoer in responsible for the entire amount of the damages.
Plaintiff may join all as defendants or select such as he wishes to hold. I SEDGwicK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) § 36a.
"Cf. I CH[AMBERLAYNE, MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1911)

§ 167, wherein it is stated

that the distinction between substance and procedure as being that between rights and remedies is subject to two limitations: (I) that many rights are procedural; (2) that the nature
of the remedy is often defined by substantive law.
' By the decision in the instant case the parties are given the same protection they would
have gotten were the suit brought in Kansas. From the conflict of laws viewpoint this
would seem a highly desirable result. GOODRICH, oP. cit. supra note I, at IO.

INATIONAL PROHIBITION ACT, 41 STAT. 313 (1919), 27 U. S. C. A. § 32 (1927)

which

reads: "Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support, or otherwise . . . by reason of the intoxication of any person . . . shall have a right of action
against any person who shall, by unlawfully selling to or unlawfully assisting in procuring
liquor for such intoxicated person, have caused or contributed to such intoxication, and in
any such action such person shall have a right to recover actual and exemplary damages.
"
. . Such action may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction ....
Grogan v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 259 U. S. 8o, 42 Sup. Ct. 423 (922).
'U. S. CONST., Amend. 18 § 2.
'U. S. CONsT., Art. I, §8, cl. 18.
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316 (i819); Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 40
Sup. Ct. 141 (192o)

; Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545, 44 Sup. Ct. 628 (i924).

REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1929), c. 43, par. 2o; N . REv. STAT. (1913) § 3859; N. H.
LAws (917) c. 147. § 36. See (1916) 64 U. OF PA. L. REV. 642 for a discussion of a similar
case before the enactment of the instant provision.
' See Foster, Civil Liability under the Volstead Act (1926) ig LAw & BANE:. 22. It
appears that the instant case, at 8oi, is the first to question the validity of the section under
discussion.
"ILL.
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transporting liquor after their owner's conviction8 and in which establishments
selling liquor have been "padlocked" have held that property was not taken
without due process of law," the present provision cannot rightfully be said to
violate any constitutional rights. There have been but a few cases tried under
the provision in question, but both actual and exemplary damages have been
recovered as the Act specifically provides.'0 Dependents have recovered damages for various types of injuries,"- but the purchaser himself has been denied
recovery. 2 The suit by the dependents in the instant case was properly brought
in a state forum because the Act stipulates that the action may be brought in
any court of competent jurisdiction; the Constitution and the laws made in
pursuance thereof are the Supreme
Law of the land and as such they must be
13
enforced by the state courts.
CONTRACTS - LIQUIDATED DAMAGES - CONCLUSIVENESS
OF
FIXED AT SUM SMALLER THAN FORESEEABLE DAMAGES-Plaintiffs

DAMAGES

contracted
to pay. "by way of penalty" ' £20 a week for delay in completing a plant. The
parties realized that in the event of delay the damages would probably be much
larger than this amount. In the action on the contract defendants counterclaimed for ten times the amount of damages fixed by the contract. Held, that
the damages for delay were liquidated at £20 a week and therefore defendants
could not counterclaim for their actual, damages. Widnes Foundry Ltd. v.
Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd., [1931] 2 K. B. 393.
An unconscionably large sum stipulated for payment on breach of a contract will be held to be a penalty; in such cases the basis of recovery is the actual
damage. 2 Should the same be true if the stipulated sum is greatly less than the
foreseeable damages? 3 The mere fact that the stipulated damages prove to be
'Chatham Motor Co. v. Griffith, 157 Ga. 8o2, 122 S. E. 218 (1924). But certain requirements of 41 STAT. 315 (1919), 27 U. S. C. A. §40 (1927) must be fulfilled.
'Peter Hand Co. v. U. S., 2 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927). United States v. Ryan,
U. S. Daily, Nov. 24, 1931, at 2171, goes further than merely to padlock the establishment
and holds that fixtures in the building wherein liquor is sold are forfeitable to the government.
,0 Stein v. Rainey, 315 Mo. 535, 286 S. W. 53 (1926) ; Smithers v. Brunkhorst, 178 Wis.
530, 19o N. W. 349 (1922).
'Lautenschlager v. Walgamott, 8o Ind. App. 198, 137 N. E. 781 (1923) (under a
similar state statute, a wife recovered damages for loss of support, when her husband committed an assault and was imprisoned while under the influence of liquor unlawfully sold
him by defendant) ; Stein v. Rainey, supra note Io (plaintiff recovered damages from one
who unlawfully sold liquor to another who shot the plaintiff); Smithers v. Brunkhorst,
supra note io (wife recovered damages from one who unlawfully sold her husband liquor,
causing his intoxication and loss of work).
mHoyt v. Tilton, 81 N. H. 477, 128 Atl. 688 (1925).
'U. S. CosT., Art. 6, cl. 2; Robb v. Connolly, iii U. S. 624, 4 Sup. Ct. 544 (1884).
'The court properly found that the parties used "penalty" and "liquidated damages"
not as words of art, but interchangeably: at 406, 415. The use of the words is not conclusive: United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U. S. O5, 27 Sup. Ct. 450 (1907) ; Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Castaneda, [i9o5] A. C. 6; Note (915) 63 U. OF PA. L. REv. 220.
'Northwestern Terra Cotta Co. v. Caldwell, 234 Fed. 491 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916);
Clements v. Schuylkill R. R., 132 Pa. 445, ig Atl. 274 (i89o) ; see Dunlop Tyre Co. v. New
Garage Motor Co., [1915] A. C. 79, 87. That the stipulated sum exceeds the actual damage does not make it a penalty: Sun Printing and Publishing Ass'n v. Moore, 183 U. S.
642, 22 Sup. Ct. 24o (i902). It will not be a penalty unless "so grossly disproportionate
to the actual injury that a man would start at the bare mention of it": Cotheal v. Talmadge, 9 N. Y. 551, 554 (1854).
'In the principal case, Slesser, L. J., and Scrutton, J., said in dictum (at 415, 407) that
a sum stipulated at less than the probable damages cannot be called a penalty. But see
Weatherford v. Adams, 31 Ariz. 187, 197, 251 Pac. 453, 456 (1926); Manley Auto Co. v.
Jackson, 115 Oreg. 396, 401, 237 Pac. 982, 983 (1925); McCelvey v. Bell, 6 S. W. (2d)
390, 392 (Tex. 1928).
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entirely inadequate for indemnity is immaterial if the damages were uncertain
at the time of contracting and the stipulated sum approximated an estimate of
foreseeable damages. 4 On the other hand, where the damages were certain and
foreseeable, courts have frequently refused to admit the validity of agreements
liquidating the damages at substantially less than the actual loss.6 These decisions seem decidedly unreasonable, since the parties to contracts should be at
liberty to limit their liability, 6 and the policy of the law favoring indemnity 7
should not be sufficient to deprive them of their freedom to contract.' A more
difficult question is whether the parties should be permitted so far to restrict
their liability that the damages recoverable would be merely nominal." In several
cases an attempt to limit liability to a point near this extreme has been defeated."'
Such cases raise the fundamental question whether as a matter of policy the
courts should sanction agreements that virtually prevent them from interceding
between the parties. 1 In the principal case, although it was apparent at the
time of contracting that 'the damage might greatly exceed the stipulated amount,
the restriction of damages was not so extreme as to leave the defendants with
only a nominal remedy, and since the evident intention of the parties was to
limit the liability,' 2 the court very properly refused to disturb the basis of
compensation set by them.

EQUITY-TRADE UNIONS-REINSTATEMENT

Two GROUNDS ONE

OF

OF MEMBER EXPELLED ON

WHICH WAS INvALID-Plaintiff petitioned for rein-

statement to an unincorporated trade union. He had been expelled for violating
the oath of obligation to the society in (I) bringing an action in the state courts
in which the officers of the union were accused of violating the by-laws and (2)
circulating libelous articles regarding these officers. He had also been fined for
these same acts on two previous charges. Held, that the plaintiff be reinstated
because the first act was not a violation of the constitution and it could not be
'Winch v. Mutual Benefit Ice Co., 9 Daly 177 (N. Y., i88o). But see the CONTRACTS
RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. i93o) § 33o (I) (b), holding that an agreement to liquidate
damages is not enforceable unless it appears after the injury has occurred that the agreed
amount is not grossly disproportionate thereto.
'Shreve v. Brereton, 51 Pa. 175 (1865) (contract said "liquidated damages and not for
a penalty"); Bonhard v. Gindin, 1o4 N. J. L. 599, 142 Ati. 52 (1928); McCelvey v. Bell,
supra note 3.
'Kemp v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 69 N. Y. 45 (877).
' Bonhard v. Gindin, supra note 5.
' Since the limitation of liability may be the only terms on which the parties would
venture to contract, it would seem to be an inexcusable meddling by the courts to give no
effect to the limitation, especially in view of the modem tendency to allow parties to compromise their differences and to enter into agreements of accord and satisfaction. See
Brightman, Liquidated Damages, (1925) 25 CoL L. Rav. 277, 303. Interference perhaps
results from the analogy to the rule that part payment will not extinguish an existing debt.
Again, confusion may arise from the reasoning that a deliberate limitation of damages must
be a penalty since it obviously cannot be liquidated damages, i. e., a "genuine covenanted
pre-estimate of damages": Watts, Watts & Co., Ltd. v. Mitsui & Co., [1917] A. C. 227, 246.
The CONTRACTS RESTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst., 1930) § 330, comment e, clarifies this matter
by providing a third type of stipulation, namely, a limitation of damages which "does not
purport to estimate damages nor to operate in terrorem."
9I. e., where there is not only a substantial reduction, but a virtual abolition of damages.
0 Hooper v. Savannah Ry., 69 Ala. 529 (1881) ; Pengra v. Wheeler, 24 Ore. 532, 34
Pac. 354 (1893).
"Since it has been held that the parties may agree not to be amenable to a court of
law, Rose & Frank Co. v. Crompton, [1923] 2 K. B. 261; (1923) 37 HAiv. L. REV. 154;
Note (1924) io CoRN. L. Q. 493, it would seem to follow that they may accomplish this
result indirectly by setting the damages at a nominal figure.
12Instant case at 409, 416.
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assumed that the expulsion for violating the oath to the society would have been
ordered if based on the second act alone. Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177
N. E. 833 (193i).

It is a general rule that courts never interfere by mandamus 1 or equitable
decree 2 until all the remedies within the organization have been exhausted 8
unless the expulsion 4 was unwarranted by the by-laws ' or the grounds for
expulsion in the by-laws void.' The first act of which the plaintiff was accused
in the principal case violated no provision of the by-laws in that it was an
original complaint against the officers of the union and not an appeal from any
decision of the union. Equity could therefore entertain this suit. As to the
second act specified, even when the by-laws do not so provide, courts imply a
provision for expulsion for acts derogatory to the best interests of the societyT
but it was properly questioned in the immediate case whether criticism of the
officers was not to the best interests of the organization. 8 In its interpretation
of the charge of violating the oath of obligation to the union the court refused
to assume that the union would have expelled the plaintiff on the basis of the
second act alone. This was correct since such an assumption would be inconsistent with the very language of the charge 9 and also with the fact that the
plaintiff had already been fined for the second act specified. It is encouraging
to note that this court, without reference to the dogma insisted on by so many
courts, 10 i. e., that there must be a property right to be protected before jurisdic'People v. Saint Franciscus Ben. Society, 24 How. Pr. 216 (N. Y. 1862).
'Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 27o Pa. 67, 813 Atl. 70 (1928).
'Robinson v. Templar Lodge, I. 0. 0. F., 117 Cal. 370, 49 Pac. 170 (1897) ; Supreme
Council of Order of Chosen Friends v. Forsinger, 125 Ind. 52, 25 N. E. 129 (i8go) ; MAR'uN, THE MODERN LAw oF LABOR UNIoNs (igio) § 317; NImtAcxc, BEz-icirAL SOCIETIS
AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE (2d ed., 1894) § 47. This is true even though a property right
is involved, Andrews v. Union of Journeymen Plumbers, 133 Misc. 899, 234 N. Y. Supp. 208
(8929) ; cf. Burke v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 273 Fed. 7o7 (D. C. D. Md.
I989).
'Typically valid grounds for expulsion are the following: Gifford v. Workmen's Benefit
Ass'n, 8O5 Me. 17, 72 AtI. 68o (i9o8) (failure to pay assessment) ; Neto v. Conselho Amor
Da Sociedade, IS Cal. App. 234, 122 Pac. 973 (902) (membership in rival association);
Commonwealth v. Union League of Phila., 135 Pa. 308, ig Atl. 8O3O (189o) (disorderly
conduct); Miller v. Hennepin County Medical Ass'n, I24 Minn. 314, I44 N. W. 1091 (8984)
(criminal misconduct).
'Otto v. Tailors' P. & B. Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 Pac. 217 (f888) ; Gardner v. East
Rock Lodge, 96 Conn. I98, 113 AtI. 3o8 (192); Abdon v. Wallace, I65 N. E. 68 (Ind.,
1929); (8930) 15 IowA L. REv. 225; BACON, BENEFICIAL SOCIETIES AND LIFE INSURANCE
(3d ed. i9O4) § io7. Before expulsion will be valid, notice must be given the accused, Von
Arx v. San Francisco Gruetli Verein, 183 Cal. 377, 45 Pac. 685 (I896) ; (1928) 72 Som.
L. 3. 179.
0 Stein v. Marks, 44 Misc. I4O, 89 N. Y. Supp. 921 (1904)
(interference with right of
franchise) ; People v. San Franciscus Ben. Society, supra note 3 (interference with religious freedom); Manning v. Klein, I Pa. Super. 2IO (8896) (interference with duty as
a citizen) ; In re Mulholland Ben. Soc. Manayunk, io Phila. 89 (Pa., 8873) (public policy) ;
Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, supra note 4 (right to petition legislature). Nor can a
member be tried twice for the same offense unless the by-laws specifically allow it, Rueb
v. Rehder, et al., 24 N. M. 534, 174 Pac. 99W (1918) ; NIILAcK, op. cit. supra note 5, § 45.
'Weiss v. Musicians Mutual Prot. Union, I89 Pa. 446, 42 Atl. 118 (1899) ; Beesley v.
Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Ass'n, 44 Ill. App. 278 (1892); see Otto v. Tailors P. &
B. Union, 75 Cal. 308, 314, 17 Pac. 217, 219 (1888).
'Weiss v. Musicians Mutual Prot. Union, supra note 9; Alnut v. Subsidiary High
Court, 62 Mich. 8IO, 28 N. W. So2 (1886); People v. Alpha Lodge, 8 App. Div. 598, 35
N. Y. Supp. 214 (18g5) ; cf. Near v.. Minnesota,t 283 U. S. 697, 719, 5i Sup. Ct. 625, 632
(893i). Contra: Hall v. Morrin, 293 S. W. 435 (Mo. App. 1927).
'This situation is not unlike a case where an appellate court reverses a verdict of the
jury because it is not clear whether that verdict was reached on the finding of fact X, which
is actionable, or fact Y which is not actionable. Bridenstine v. Gerlinger Motor Car Co.,
86 Ore. 411, 868 Pac. 922 (197).
" Robinson v. Dahm, 94 Misc. -729, 159 N. Y. Supp. 1053 (1g86); Lawson v. Hewell, i18
Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897); Pound, Equitable Relief Against Injuries to Personality
(i916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 64o; WALSH, EQurIT (893o) 275-278.
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tion will be conceded, 1 ' prevented irreparable harm and protected per se what
Pound calls 12 "an interest of personality", that is, the opportunity to practice
a trade.

EQUITY-WILLS--ELECTION-SEQUESTRATION OF WIDOW'S LIFE INTEREST
DISAPPOINTED RESIDUARY LEGATnFs-Testator's widow as-

TO COM!PENSATE

serted her statutory right 1 to claim against the will thereby terminating a life
interest in personal property contained therein. Her choice diminished the portion the residuary legatee would otherwise have taken but did not affect the
amount the remaindermen were entitled to. The lower court decreed that the
bequest be immediately distributed to the remaindermen. Held, that the decree
be reversed and that the widow's life interest be sequestered for the benefit of
the residuary legatee.
(1931).

In re Lonergav's Estate, 303 Pa. 142, 154 Atl. 387

Vested remainders following a forfeited life interest are accelerated unless
the testator's expressed intention dictates otherwise.2 This principle, however,
is subject to qualification 3 where a beneficiary, compelled by equity to elect to
take either under the will or against it,' abandons his life interest. In this case,
unless acceleration proportionately compensates all of the specific beneficiaries
whose shares have been consumed or reduced by the election, 5 the interest is
sequestered for their benefit. By so doing the courts purport to be carrying out
the testator's presumed intention. But the real moving force of the doctrine is
a sense of what is fair and just since no more than a guess can be hazarded as
to the distribution the testator would have intended had he contemplated the
facts as they actually exist. An overemphasis on presumed intention has lead
to conflicting views where only the residuaries are disappointed by the election.
'Rogers v. Tangier Temple, 112 Neb. 166, 198 N. W. 873 (924); State v. New
Orleans Funeral Directors' Ass'n, 161 La. 81, lO8 So. 132 (1926) ; Kearns and Smith v.
Howley, 188 Pa. 116, 41 Ati. 273 (1898); Note (930) 78 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 645.
' Pound, Equit. R. etc., op. cit. supra note 10.
'PA. STAT. (West, 192o) § 8355, PA STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) title 20 § 261.
'Jull v. Jacobs, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 703 (1876) ; Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 18o Ark. 552, 22
S. W. (2d) 370 (193o) ; Re Schulz, i13 Mich. 592, 71 N. W. 2O79 (1897) ; 2 ALEXANDER,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF

WnLs (1918) § 837;

2 PAGE, WHLs (1927)

§ 1224.

The

from an interpretation of the testator's intention to postthe preceding life estate. Therefore it has been held, alremainder is accelerated although contingent on the taker's
v. Roe, 5 Boyce 545, 93 Atl. 373 (Del. 1914) ; O'Rear. v.
Bogie, 157 Ky. 666, 163 S. W. 1107 (914) ; Note (92o) 5 A. L. R. 473. Contra: Brandenburg v. Thorndyke, 139 Mass. 102, 28 N. E. .575 (1885) ; cf. Miller v. Miller, 91 Kan. 1, 136
Pac. 953 (1913) (Impossibility of identifying remaindermen, heirs or' life tenant, until latter's death). More authority supports acceleration where there is an alternative substitutional gift, Sherman v. Flack, 283 Ill. 457, 119 N. E. 293 (1918) 4 Disston's Estate, 257 Pa.

doctrine of acceleration proceeds
pone enjoyment merely to let in
though not unanimously, that the
living at the widow's death, Roe

537, 1o

At. 804 .(1917) ; Note (292o)

5 A. L. R. 46o.

Contra: Sawyer v. Freeman, 161

A to whether a remainder, postponed. in enjoyment by
Mass. 543, 37 N. E, 942 (894).
allotment of dower or by the necessity of compensating disappointed beneficiaries, becomes
vested upon the failure of the preceding life estate there is little judicial opinion, Note (192o)
5 A. L. R. 480.
'Ostram v. Datz, 274 Pa. 375, 118 Atl. 313 (1922) ; Sherman v. Baker, 2o R. I. 613, 40
Atl. 765 (I898) ; 2 ALEXANDER, loc. cit. supra note 2, 2 PAGE, loc. cit. sapra note 2.
' That the forfeiture is only to an extent necessary to compensate the disappointed beneficiaries, see Vance's Estate, 141 Pa. 201, 210, 21 Atl. 643, 644 (1891).
6 Coover's Appeal, 74 Pa. 143 (1873).
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The minority, 6 to which Pennsylvania was committed prior to the present decision,7 conceived that the testator intended to have the provisions of the will
carried out in the outlined order, first specific gifts, then residuary. Therefore
the loss must fall on the residuaries because it is the "inevitable necessity" of
that kind of gift to include only what remains after the specific gifts have been
satisfied. However, in Pennsylvania at least, this construction could be overcome by an expression of intention indicating that the residuaries were "the
favorite objects of'the testator's bounty".8 The exact nature of the intention
was never made clear. The view of the majority,9 which is that of the instant
case, proceeds from the realization that it is impossible to effect a distribution
in strict compliance with the terms of the will and that it is better to approximate
equitably what the distribution would have been but for the election than to
grope blindly after an unexpressed intention. The earlier Pennsylvania cases
indicated that this view was undesirable because it encouraged uncertainty in
the law.10 But the only uncertainty is in the facts necessary to bring the rule
into operation. This involves computation no more complicated than that which
a court of equity ordinarily undertakes. 1

FEDERAL COURTS-REMOVAL OF CAUSES-JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH STATE LAw-Defendant insurance company contracted to be

liable on any cause of action for damages-which might arise against the insured
defendant due to the latter's negligence. Plaintiff, who was injured due to
insured defendant's negligence, joined foreign insurance company in the suit as
a party defendant, such joinder being permissible in Texas. Insurance company
filed a petition for removal to the federal district court. Held, that the case was
not removable since there was no separable controversy. Lake et al. v. Texas
News Co. et al., 51 F. (2d) 862 (S. D. Tex. 1931).
By judicial construction ' the ambiguous third sentence of section 28 of
the Judicial Code 2 has been held to provide that a cause is removable to the
0

Church Home v. Morriss, 99 Ky. 317- 36 S. W.

2

(18g6) ; see McGinnis v. McGinnis,

I Ga. 496, 499 (1846) ; cf. Crocker v. Crocker, 230 Mass. 478, 12o N. E. i1o (i918), where

Firth v. Denny, infra note IO, was distinguished and a strange result reached. The Crocker
case and Hesseltine v. Partridge, 236 Mass. 77, 127 N. E. 429 (12o) make doubtful the

present Massachusetts law which was formerly clear (Firth v. Denny, infra note io).
7 Ferguson's Estate, 138 Pa. 2o8, 2o At. 945 (189o) ; Vance's Estate, supra note 5.
' Portuondo's Estate, 185 Pa. 472, 39 Ad. 11o5 (i898) ; Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. i45,
i8o S. W. 176 (9,5).
I Hinckley v. House of Refuge, 40 Md. 461 (1874) ; Firth v. Denny, 2 Allen 468 (Mass.
1861); Sellick v. Sellick, 207 Mich. 194, 173 N. W. 6og (1919); Jones v. Knappen, 63 Vt
391, 22 Atl. 630 (i8gi).
" "The law must have a settled and uniform rule", Vance's Estate, supra note 5, at 220.
But in Meek v. Trotter, supra note 9, at 157, 18o S. W. at 179, it was said pertinently of
the Pennsylvania rule and exception as enunciated in Ferguson's Estate, supra note 8, that
"This places the rule on an illusory and unsatisfactory basis".
' E. g., the calculation of the value of a wife's inchoate dower right, Jackson v. Edwards,
7 Paige 386, 408 (N. Y. 1839); Note (1924) 9 CoRN. L. Q. 47o. But in Hesseltine v.
Partridge, supr note 7, the Massachusetts court refused to undertake the difficulty of accurate computation of the actual consequences to the other beneficiaries of the widow's assertion of her statutory right and of the ademption of several devises.
'Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205 (i88o) ; Fraser v. Jennison, iO6 U. S. 191, 1 Sup. Ct.
I'i (1882); 4 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTISE JURISDICTION & PaROCEURE (1931) § 2361 et
seq.; LEwis, REovAL OF CAUSES (1923) § 148; LONG, OUTLINE OF THE JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (3d ed. 1917) § 90.
236 STAT. i094 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 71 (1926). "And when in any suit there shall be
a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different states, and which can be fully
determined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants actually interested in
such controversy may remove said suit into the district court."
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federal district courts if in the plaintiff's pleadings 3 there appears a separable
controversy, wholly between the plaintiff and the defendant seeking the removal,
and as between them there is diversity of citizenship.4 If it is determined that
a separable controversy is present in the case, the removal of that part carries with
it the entire suit, including the case of the defendant as to whom there is no
diversity of citizenship.5 On the other hand, if no separable controversy can be
discovered, removal will be denied unless all of the plaintiffs are of different
citizenship from that of all of the defendants.6 Where the parties are joined
in an action under common law principles of joinder, it is obvious that an7 effort
to remove on the grounds of separable controversy will be unsulccessful. The
difficult situation arises when the district court is confronted with a joinder of
parties by reason of a state statute or state practice.8 It then becomes incumbent
upon the court to determine whether or not a separable controversy in fact
exists, although the parties defendant have been brought together in a single
3
Barney v. Latham; Fraser v. Jennison, both supra note I; Henderlong v. Standard Oil
Co. of Cal., 17 F. (2d) 184 (N. D. Cal. 1926).
'See supra note I.
' Under the first removal statute, 14 STAT. 3o6 (1866), the removal was confined to the

separable controversy, leaving the remainder of the action in the original state court. In
Barney v. Latham, supra note I, at 213, the Supreme Court said, "Much confusion and embarrassment, as well as increase in cost of litigation . . ." resulted from this practice of
splitting up such a suit between courts and so it construed the Act of 1875, IS STAT. 470, as
providing that a removal of the part removed the entire action. The Judicial code has subsequently made no change in this respect.
See as to removal of only a part if separate suits rather than separablc controversies are
involved, In re Stutsman County, 88 Fed. 337 (C. C. N. D. N. D. 1898) ; Lucania Societe, etc.
v. United States Shipping Board, etc., Corp., 15 F. (2d) 568 (S. D. N. Y. 1923); Note
(1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. lo48.
' There is a necessity for diversity of citizenship between all parties plaintiff and defendant in cases in which federal district courts take original jurisdiction under § 41 of the
Judicial Code. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182, 44 Sup. Ct.
266 (1924).

Likewise, for removal under § 71 of the Judicial Code, there must be diversity of citizenship between all parties unless there is a separable controversy. Gardner v. Brown, 21
Wall. 36 (1874) ; Pepper v. Fordyce, 119 U. S. 469, 7 Sup. Ct. 287 (1886).
'Core v. Vinal, 117 U. S. 347, 6 Sup. Ct. 767 (1886) (joint action for tort) ; Boykin v.
Morris Fertilizer Co., 257 Fed. 827 (N. D. Ga. 1919) (joint action on a contract).

If plaintiff elects that the-action shall be joint rather than several, the defendant has no
grounds for removal. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Dowell, 229 U. S. 102, 33 Sup. Ct. 684
(1913); German-American Mercantile Bank v. Gas Service Corp. of America, 228 Fed.
827 (W. D. Wash. 1915) ; Baillie v. Backus, 23o Fed. 711 (D. C. Ore. 1916).

8
Manufacturers' Commercial Co. v. Brown Alaska Co., 148 Fed. 308 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
i9o6) (statute permitted maker of a promissory note and indorsers thereon to be joined) ;
Young v. Southern Pacific Co., 15 F. (2d) 280 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) (statute allowed a joinder of actions by plaintiffs who have either joint or several rights where a common question
of law or facts exists).
As to joinder of insurance company in the action against the tort-feasor, see Gugliemetti
v. Graham, 5o Cal. App. 268 (12o) ; American Auto Ins. Co. v. Struwe, 218 S. W. 534
(192o) (privilege of joining by reason of state practice) ; Morell v. Zalonde, 271 Fed. 19
(D. P. I. 1921) (statute provided that insured and insurer may be joined in one action) ; 6
COO- EY, BRIFS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1928) § 702 et seq.; 5 CoucH, CYcLoPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929) § 1175 et seq.; Note (1929) 9 ORE. L. REV. 57.
This problem conceivably may arise in Pennsylvania under the Act of April IO, 1929,
P. L. 419, as amended by Act of June 22, 1931, No. 236, by which a direct judgment can be
obtained by the plaintiff against a defendant added by the original defendant. Should the
added defendant claim diversity of citizenship, the removal could only be sustained on
grounds of the presence of a separable controversy as to that added defendant. See Scott,
Some Aspects of the Pennsylvania Sci. Fa. Act for the Addition of Defendants Not Originally Sued (931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 3o6, 310.

RECENT CASES

action in the original proceedings in the state court.' In search of some guiding
principle to follow in determining the separableness of the controversy this test
is applied: can the case be separated into parts so that in one of these parts a
controversy will be presented with citizens of one or more states on one side,
and citizens of other states on the other side, which can be fully determined
without the presence of any of the other parties to the suit, as it has been begun
in the state court.10 Submitting the instant case to this test, it follows that the
decision disallowing the petition to remove conforms with the principles formulated by the federal courts. While it is true that the action against the parties
defendant is not a joint one,"' the controversy as to the removing defendant
is
2
not one which is determinable without the presence of the wrongdoer.1

INCOME TAX-CARRYING ON BUSINESS-RIGHT TO CARRY OVER LossEs

STOCK-A retired lawyer had large investments in approximately
ten corporations to whose affairs he devoted his entire time. In 1912 he organized a railroad for the purpose of developing the timberland of four other
corporations controlled by him. On the liquidation of the road in 1922 he sold
his stock at a loss which he seeks to carry over and deduct from his 1923 profit
as a "business" loss so deductible under the Federal Income Tax Act of 1921.3
Held, that the loss could be carried over since the petitioner took such an active
part in the management of the enterprises in which he had invested as to constitute a business. Washburn v. Commissioner, 51 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A. 8th,
1931).
No general definition of the term "business" has, as yet, been formulated 2
which is really helpful in the solution of problems arising under this section.
All that can be definitely said by way of delimitation is that it must be an
activity consisting of a series of acts carried on with a view to profit.' In
examining the factual situations involving sales of stock it is found that a distinction has been made between a mere investor, whose losses are not deemed
'See Manufacturers' Commercial Co. v. Brown Alaska Co., supra note 8, at 310, wherein
IN SALES OF

it is said: "The cause of action does not become joint, or joint and several, from the mere
fact that the plaintiff elects to avail itself of statutory permission and unites parties in the
same action."

"Blake v. McKim

103

U. S. 336 (I88o) ; Fraser v. Jennison, sapra note i; Geer v.

Mathieson Alkali Works, i9O U. S. 428, 23 Sup. Ct. 8o7 (i9o2) ; Roberts v. Underwood
Typewriter Co., 257 Fed. 583 (D. N. J. 1919).
A removable separable controversy within the meaning of the statute must be more
than a mere collateral or incidental dispute. Where it is a mere adjunct of the principal dispute, which cannot exist separately, there can be no removal. Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Huntington, 117 U. S. 28o, 6 Sup. Ct. 733 (1886) ; Security Co. v. Pratt, 64 Fed. 405 (C. C. D.
Conn. 1894).
Clearly an action. agaist one party in tort and another in contract, as in the instant
case, is not a joint one at common law and does not involve joint liability. Branchville Motor Co. v. American Surety Co. of New York, 27 F. (2d) 631 (E. D. S. C. 1928).
IIt is apparent that in joinders as in the instant case, the determination which will fix
the liability of the insurance company, is whether or not the insured is liable to the plaintiff,
thus making the presence of the insured essential to the action against the insurer.
1 42 Stat. 231 (1g2i). The present statute applicable is 45 Stat. 825, 26 U. S. C. A.
§2117 (928).
'The courts

have frequently cited with approval the definition set forth in Flint v.
Stone Tracey, 220 U. S. 107, 171, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 357 (i910): "Business is a very comprehensive term and embraces everything about which a person can be employed." This
definition is not only hopelessly broad but is also probably of slight utility in the present
situation. The court in that case was construing the term in an attempt to decide whether
a corporation was "doing business" so as to be taxable. The purpose in this section is entirely different. See Hughes v. Commissioner, 38 F. (2d) 755, 757 (C. C. A. ioth, I93O).
'Note (92)
71 U. OF PA. L. REv. 255.
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business losses, and a speculator, financier, promoter, or manager. Thus the
stock losses sustained by a broker who dabbled in stocks,4 by the organizer of
a single company from investments therein,5 or by a general manager from
investments in his company ' have been held not to constitute business losses.
On the other hand the stock losses arising from the transaction of 70 stock
deals a year, 7 the organization of five companies over a period of years, s and
the investment in another company to procure an agency 9 have been held losses
sustained in business. The instant case advances the principle that investment
plus active management of the enterprises invested in constitutes a business as
distinguished from the mere guarding of investments.10 It is submitted that
in the similar cases set forth above the investment had to be incidental to the
management to be deductible. This would seem to be more in accord with the
Congressional intent since the term business was obviously meant to be restrictive-for otherwise all losses would have been made deductible. 1'

INCOME TAX-STATE TAX BASED ON FEDERAL RETURNS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAX APPLICABLE TO PRIOR UNREALIZED CAPITAL GAINS-A statute I

passed in 1929 by Georgia levied an income tax based on the tax return submitted to the Federal Government. Plaintiffs, in 1929, sold securities realizing
a profit from an increment in value which occurred prior to 1929. Plaintiffs
sought to enjoin defendant from levying a tax on this profit. Held (three
judges dissenting) ,2 that the state could tax the profit since it was income for
1929 and that the tax was not retroactive. Norman, Tax Commissioner v,
Bradley et. al., 16o S. E. 413 (Ga. i931).
"Rehm v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 1045 (1929) ; cf. Goldner v. Commissioner, 36 F.
(2d) 551 (App. D. C., 1929).
'Hedrick v. Commissioner, 2o B. T. A. 258 (1930).
Gutman v. Commissioner, 7 B. T. A. 5oo (1927); cf. Harris v. Commissioner, 8 B.
T. A. 1234 (927)
(Harris incorporated his business and it subsequently failed. He began
in the same line again).
'Elliott v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 494 (9n)
(the petitioner spent 75 per cent.
of his time in his dealings) ; cf. Carrol v. Commissioner, 2o B. T. A. lO29 (i93o) (the
petitioner
had only 15-25 dealings a year).
8
Anthony v. Commissioner. 2o B. T. A. .5 (1930) ; -cf. Pottei v. Commissioner, 18 B.
T. A. 549 (1929) (Potter made a business of starting hotels and supervising them).
'Kobbe v. Commissioner, 4 B. T. A. 663 (1926) ; cf. Huxford v. Commissioner, 2o B.
T. A.0 39 (1930) (the petitioner started a store as incidental to his manufacturing town).
1 It is submitted that the courts are running into grave danger of confusing the mere
investment of a large fortune with the business of financing, investment banking, etc. It
must be remembered that the mere guarding of a large fortune may require a large amount
of time and labor. At the same time the amount of money invested makes it probable that
the investor will have some voice in the policies and direction of the enterprise. In this
connection see Averill v. Commissioner, 2o B. T. A. 1196 (1930); Ostenburg v. Commissioner, i7 B. T. A. 738 (1929) (the petitioner devoted all his time to the investment of his
fortune).
See Hughes v. Commissioner, supra note 2, at 757.

'GA.

LAws,

1929,

p.

92.

'The profits in question arose from two sales of stocks, one of which occurred prior to
the passing of the statute and which was, therefore, in the opinion of two of the dissenting
judges untaxable by reason of a constitutional provision against retroactive legislation. The
statute, having been passed in October, expressly provided that the tax for 1929 should be
based on one-fourth of the income for that year. In State of Texas v. Galveston, etc. RR.
Co., ioo Tex. 153, 97 S. W. 71 (iqo6), the court held that a statute passed on July 5, 1905
should be construed as taxing 169/365 of the income for that year since a constitutional
provision of Texas forbade retroactive legislation. But cf. Smith v. Dirck, 283 Mo. 188,
223 S. W. 1o4 (i92o) where it was held that a constitutional prohibition of retroactive legislation would prevent taxation of income received prior to the passage of the act in the
middle of the year.
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Income taxes were originally applied only to income actually earned during
the preceding year.' This principle, for purposes of expediency, was discarded
under the Federal tax in the case of capital assets.4 Accordingly such increments of value are permitted to accrue without taxation over a period of years,
the tax on the increase being paid in full when such profit is realized.5 The
federal courts, however, have not permitted the taxation of capital gain accruing
prior to the effective date of the Federal Income Tax Acts 1 since, for purposes
of taxation, all increase in value of capital assets prior to March 1, 1913, was
capital on that date and non-taxable as income thereafter.7 In the instant case
the court indicates that, since the state tax was based on the Federal tax act
which permitted the taxation of all capital gain accruing subsequent to March i,
1913, therefore the same date could serve as the basis of the state tax. This
conclusion seems wrong because such tax would, in reality, become a tax upon
property or capital rather than upon income. Of course the state has the
power, which the Federal Government lacks, to levy a property tax without
apportionment based on population but to levy such a tax under the guise of
an income tax exclusively 8 seems to be retroactive legislation as prohibited by
the constitution of Georgia.9 The court, however, attempted to avoid this
conclusion by saying that capital gain became income only upon realization and
that then the total profit accruing became taxable. It is submitted that a mere
'In Bailey v. Railroad Co., io6 U. S. Iog,-at I15, 1 Sup. Ct. 62, at 67 (1882), it was
said,". . . . no tax in the contemplation of the law accrues upon the fund [whether it be

earnings, profits, gains or income] except for the year in which the fund itself accrues." In
Gray v. Darlington, 15 Wall. 63 (U. S., 1872), Justice Fields declared that an early income
tax could be applied only to profits and gains resulting from transactions begun and completed during the preceding year.
'Capital gain is taxable as income, 26 U. S. C. § 2o22 (a) (1928).
'Merchants Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 41 Sup. Ct. 386 (1921);
Goodrich v. Edwards, 2.55 U. S. 527, 41 Sup. Ct. 390 (1921). The effect of such a pro-

cedure is to eliminate annual fluctuations in the value of assets resulting in corresponding
fluctuations in income and to require the inclusion of such income only for one period, that

of realization. Realization has been held to be a' requirement to the existence of income,
but the courts have deviated from the full implications of this "money income concept" by
the technique of a liberal interpretation of what constitutes realization. See Rottschaeffer,
The Concept of Income in Federal Taxation (1929) 13 MINN. L. R..637; Magill, The Taxation of Unrealized Income (1925) 39 HARv. L. R. 82. An income tax may be levied on a

capital gain resulting from a mere exchange of capital assets, Marr v. United States, 268
U. S. 536, 45 Sup. Ct. 575 (1925). Indeed the payment of Federal taxes on an accrual
basis is a recognition of the existence of income prior to actual realization. Since it has
been held that capital losses may be deducted from gross income even though the loss was
not actually realized by a sale of the capital asset, it seems that the inverse should follow,

i. e., capital gain may exist, although untaxable, prior to realization.
White Dental Co., 274 U. S. 398, 47 Sup. Ct. 598 (1927).

United States v.

GUnder both the Corporation Excise Act of igog and the Federal Income Tax Act of
I913, where no date was set for the valuation of capital assets, it was held that they should
be valued as of the effective date of the act, Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U. S. 179, 38 Sup.
Ct. 467 (I918) (Act of 19o9) ; Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S. 221, 38 Sup. Ct. 537 (ii8)
(Act of 1913) ; Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure (1925) 651, "The courts have consistently held under both the 19o9 and 1913 laws, that increases in the value of property, to be
subject to the tax, must have occurred during the period when the law was effective."
'In Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330, 335, 38 Sup. Ct. 540, 542 (1918), the
court said: ".

.

. we are bound to consider accumulations that accrued to a corporation

prior to January I, 1913 as being capital, not income, for the purposes of the act."
'Cf. An income tax statute, MAss. GEr. LAWS (1926) c. 62, § 5, specifically levying a
tax against income on annuities which in reality were not taxable as income since the annuity payments represented merely a return of capital invested. Since the state has a right
to tax capital as property, a different result follows than if the state, without specifically
providing for a tax upon annuities, attempted to tax them as income.
'GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 6; Ross v. Lettice, 134 Ga. 866, 68 S. E. 734 (1910);
see ENDLICH, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (1888) § 273.
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exchange of one asset for another of like value can produce no taxable income
since the owner was no richer after the exchange than before; here the sale of
the securities did not create the income, as the court has assumed, it was merely
the legally operative act 10 which changed accrued increment into realized gains.

INTERSTATE COMMERcE-TAXATION-VALIDITY

OF STATE TAX ON SALE
im-

OF POWER GENERATED IN ANOTHER STATE-A South Carolina statute'

posed a tax upon each kilowatt hour of electric power sold within the state.
The complainant who sold in South Carolina power generated in another state
contended that the tax was invalid as a burden on interstate commerce. Held,
that the tax was valid. South CarolinaPower Co. v. South CarolinaTax Cornmission, .52 F. (2d) 515 (E.D. S.C.1931).
Two extreme situations are quite clear in the determination of what is
interstate commerce within the meaning of the rule that interstate commerce
may not be burdened by state taxation. 2 Thus, a tax on the sale of merchandise3
in state A for transportation to state B, is a tax on inter-state commerce,
whereas a tax on the sale in state B of goods which happen to have been brought
from state A, subsequent to the transportation, is considered a tax on intrastate
commerce and therefore valid.4 However, some difficulty is encountered in
reconciling cases falling between these two poles. An illustration is furnished
by the cases where, on the one hand, orders given to an agent of a foreign
principal, involving the forwarding of commodities from another state, are
treated as sales in interstate commerce; 5 and where, on the contrary, orders
taken by a local "automobile agency", necessitating the sending of orders by
the agency to the foreign manufacturer are considered intra-state contracts and
hence taxable. 6 The cases can be distinguished by noting that in the former it
is the purchaser's ordef which more clearly and directly brings about the interstate transportation; in the latter, it is a subsequent and second order of another
party, i. e., the dealer. The question, "Who is the prime mover?", suggests
itself as a formula to 'determine when a sale is to be considered interstate commerce. If the prime mover is the vendee, then the sale is interstate commercebut if the vendor within the state is the actuator of ,the foreign shipment, then
the sale is intra-state commerce. Applying this formula to the principal case,
we may say that as a scientific matter, the turning of the switch by the vendee
was an order causing the interstate shipment. From a common sense viewpoint, however, a company which enjoys a local monopoly, maintaining offices
and electrical transformers within the state, and contracting with local citizens
to supply a service is primarily the motivating factor in effecting the interstate
'The sale of securities is the act which the law recognizes as completing the transaction of acquiring and holding the securities but "...This does not mean that the law
assumes that that act (the sale) is the effective force responsible for the existence of the
income that the taxpayer is required to return." Rottschaeffer, Federal Taxation, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 645.
C. STAT. AT LARGE 357 (1931).
'UNITED STATES COSTTuTioN, Art. I, §
8
v. Iowa, i96 U. S.

'S.

8, cl. 3.

133, 25 Sup. Ct. 182 (i9o5) ; Dahnke-Walker
American Express Co.
Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 42 Sup. Ct. io6 (Iqei).
'Bowman v. Continental Oil, 256 U. S. 642, 41 Sup. Ct. 6o6 (i921) ; People v. Raynes,
136 App. Div. 417, i2o N. Y. Supp. 1053 (91o).
' Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby Co., 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592 (1887) ; Palmer
v. Aeolian Co., 46 F. (2d) 746 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
'Banker Brothers Co. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U. S.210, 32 Sup. Ct 38 (1911) ; cf. Hall
v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S.539, 37 Sup. Ct. 217 (1916).
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movement. 7 In justification of the latter attitude and the court's conclusion,,
is the policy that corporations engaged in commerce within the state should
share with other commercial enterprises the financial expense of supporting
that government. 9

MORTGAGES-PRIORITY AMONG AFTER-AcQuIRED PROPERTY LIENS CONFLICTING DUE TO PURCHASE OF ONE RAILROAD BY ANOTHER-X Railroad, on

which there was a mortgage with an after-acquired property clause, purchased
Y railroad and assumed the obligations in the -mortgage on Y railroad. The
mortgage on Y railroad had an after-acquired property clause which included
property to be acquired for the Y line by its successors. Held, that the X
mortgage, since it was the prior of two equal equities, was a prior lien on property acquired after the purchase, not only as to property bought for the X line
but also as to property bought for the Y line. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 52 F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931). 1
There are no precedents directly bearing on this situation," so the court
took as its major premise the rule that the prior of two equal equities shall prevail,3 and as its minor premise the fact that X Railroad had mortgaged its afteracquired property before it covenanted to be bound by the obligations of the
Y mortgage. On the theory that an after-acquired property clause is only an
executory contract enforceable in equity,4 the major premise was properly
chosen, and the syllogism correctly solved by holding that the X mortgage had
a prior lien. As the court put the problem, 5 it was as if X railroad had twice
' For an enlightened treatment of the development of state and federal regulation and
control over power companies, see Rose, Control of Super-Power (193i) 8o U. OF PA. L.
REv. 153. The case under discussion is to be distinguished from the so-called pipe line cases,
for those cases are in the main concerned with the power of a state to regulate rates where
no federal action has been taken or where the regulation affects sales in another state.
'The court rested its decision upon a two-fold basis. First, that the taxable low voltage
current was a new current produced in the state, by the transformer from high voltage
current and therefore the sale was a sale of locally manufactured goods. Secondly, that
the sale of power was similar to the sale of goods from another state after the original
package was broken. It is difficult to understand the purpose of invoking the analogy of
the original package doctrine; for that doctrine concerns itself with the power of a state
to regulate intra-state sales of foreign goods, when it does not appear that the goods were
transported in response to an ultimate vendee's order. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262
U. S. 5o6, 46 Sup. Ct. 643 (1922).
'The desirability of requiring interstate enterprises to bear a proportion of the state
expenses has been recognized and expressed by several authorities. I COOLEY, TAXATION
(1924) § 384; Powell, Supreme Court Decisions on the Commerce Clause and State Taxing
Power (1922),

22 COL. L. REv. 133, 150.

'Three separate appeals are reported together in 52 F. (2d) 418; the point here discussed came up in appeal No. 9148 found in (3) and beginning on page 421 of the report.
Prior proceedings in the case are reported in 33 F. (2d) 512 (D. Minn., 1928) and 36 F.
(2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
See Foley and Pogue, After-Acquired Property Under Conflicting Corporate Mortgage Indentures (1929) 13 MINN. L. REv. 8r.
aPomEROY, EQUITY JuRIsPRuDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 678.
'Seymour v. Canandaigua & N. F. Ry., 25 Barb. 284 (N. Y., 1857); Pennock v. Coe,
64 U. S. 117 (1859); Trust Co. of America v. City of Rhinelander, 182 Fed. 64 (W. D.
Wis., i91O) ; Foley and Pogue, After-Acquired Property Under Conflicting CorporateMortgage Indentures, supra note 2. The English theory is that there is an equitable assignment,
the mortgagor being trustee for the mortgagee as assignee. Holroyd v. Marshall, io H. L.
Cas. 191; 11 Eng. Rep. 999 (1862); In re Lind, [1915] 2 Ch. 345; Blair, Allocation of
After-Acquired Mortgaged Property (1926) 40 HARv. L. REv. 222.
'One would expect the problem put by the court to be the true problem, as ordinarily
the lien of a mortgage as to after-acquired property does not survive a transfer of the mortgaged property. Trust Co. of America v. City of Rhinelander, supra note 4; Metropolitan
Trust Co. v. Chicago & E. I. Ry., 253- Fed. 868 (C. C. A. 7th, 1918) ; New York Security
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mortgaged its after-acquired property, in which situation the earlier mortgage
is the prior lier. 6 But the court in choosing its minor premise, disregarded its
decision on a previous appeal of the same case,' where it had held that, apart
from any assumption by X Railroad, the lien of the Y mortgage survived the
purchase, because the Y mortgage in express terms covered property to be
acquired by its successorss Thus the case could not be solved on the grounds
that the Y lien dated.only from the time of its revival in the assumption by X
Railroad: the Y lien survived the purchase of its own force and in its own
right. Since the rule of priority taken by the court as its major premise, applies
only to equities which are conflicting from the time the second equity is created,' it could have no application here where the equities were totally independent and consistent until the purchase of Y Railroad by X Railroad brought
them into conflict.10 When this conflict between the X and Y liens first arose,
the promise of Y mortgagors-that their lien as to after-acquired property would
survive any transfer-was an existing obligation which the court had held
would run with the road, so that the X lien could not attach other than subject
to that obligation.11 X Railroad could not, because of any clause in its own
mortgage, acquire more by a purchase than there was to buy: it could not buy
mortgaged property and because of the after-acquired property clause take the
property free of the mortgage; 12 no more could it acquire Y Railroad without
& Trust Co. v. Louisville Ry., lO2 Fed. 382 (C. C. D. Ind., 1goo). In many states there
are statutes by virtue of which an after-acquired property lien will survive a purchase or
consolidation. Cf. Marfield v. Traction Co., iii Ohio St. i39, 144 N. E. 689 (1924) ; Foley
and Pogue, op. cit. supra note 2.
'Pennock v. Coe, supra note 4; Galveston, H. & H. Ry. v. Coudert, 78 U. S. 459 (870);
Commercial Trust Co. v. Chattanooga Ry. & Light Co., 282 Fed. 856 (E. D. Tenn., 1921);
Foley and Pogue, op. cit. supra note 2, at ioi.
7
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 36 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
'Guaranty Trust Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., supra note 7; Compton v. Jesup, 68
Fed. 263 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895). The effect of these cases is to make an after-acquired property clause a covenant running with the railroad-at least where the purchasing company
has not mortgaged its after-acquired property. Cf. Midland Ry. v. Fisher, 125 Ind. rp, 24
N. E. 756 (i8o). It is impossible to support these cases on the theory that a mortgage of
after-acquired property takes effect as an executory contract: A can not mortgage B's property; no more can A mortgage property B is going to acquire. Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v.
.N. Y. & Q. C. Ry., 253 N. Y. 190, 17o N. E. 887 (193o); see Foley and Pogue, AfterAcquired Property Under Conflicting Corporate Mortgage Indentures, supra note 2, at p. 99.
It is submitted that it is highly desirable that it be possible to make an after-acquired property clause run with a railroad, so that bondholcd-s under a railroad mortgage may be able
to count on the security of after-acquired property, no matter into whose hands the road
goes.
' PiiERoy, op. cit. supra note 3 § 683. The rule qui prior est tem1pore, potior est iure,
naturally applies only to successive interests in the same property, where it is obvious that
the junior equity can take only what is left by its senior. It would be ridiculous to hold,
and the instant court did not profess to hold, that the X lien was prior to the Y lien because
the X mortgage was executed in i899 while the Y mortgage was not executed until 19oi;
mere antiquity should not be a ratio decidendi. No distinction is made on this ground where
one railroad has purchased two others both of which have after-acquired property clauses
surviving the purchase. Citizens' Savings & Trust Co. v. Dayton Traction Co., io6 Ohio
St. 577, 14o N. E. 380 (1922).
'0It should not be a ground for distinguishing between the two liens that X railroad
was the active party in creating the conflict.
' Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co., 9o Fed. 322 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898) ; Westinghouse
Electric v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co., 276 Fed. 152 (S. D. N. Y., 1921). The lien of an
after-acquired property clause attaches subject also to all liens whose creation was essential
to the acquisition of the property, as, for example, a purchase money mortgage. United
States v. New Orleans Ry., 79 U. S. 362 (187o) ; Blair, op. cit. supra note 4, beginning at
P. 240.
. Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co.; Westinghouse Electric v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit
Co., both supra note ii.
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the Y lien being prior as to property X might subsequently acquire for Y line.
There is the sound economic consideration in support of giving the Y lien
priority as to property acquired for Y line, that the Y mortgagees knew that any
road running Y line would have to acquire such property and were thus contracting for a relatively certain security on which they relied, whereas X mortgagees knew that X Railroad might not acquire other lines, and hence were only
relying on a speculative security.'3

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-PECuLIAR RULE AS TO NOTICE IMPUTED TO
PRINCIPAL-DUTY OF ATTORNEY IN SEARCHING PRIOR MORTGAGES AND LIENS

-An attorney drew up a mortgage to X. Subsequently, the attorney, while
acting as agent for the mortgagor and Y7, drew up a mortgage to Y. Y recorded
his mortgage prior to X and he had no actual knowledge of X's mortgage.
Held, that X's mortgage was a prior lien since Y would have learned of the
prior mortgage if he had acted himself or had engaged another attorney.
Reiners v. Hawthorne, 156 Atl. 370 (N. J. 1931).
The rule presented by this court is one apparently peculiar to New Jersey.,
It first appeared as dictum 2 in Sooy v. State; 3 and while it was overruled by a
later decision,4 the more recent cases 1 in this state have adopted it.

From the

standpoint of logic the rule has little to recommend it. The court must resort
to a series of assumptions, and any rule that has this as its basis is out of place
in a system where fact is of paramount importance. In applying the rule, the
court correctly held that a man may be charged with his agent's knowledge even
though the agent is acting for another principal.
But while using language
' Courts recognize this distinction between after-acquired property used to keep a railroad running and after-acquired property consisting of roads or other property already
constructed and bought to extend the system, by holding that there is an implied promise
to acquire the first sort of property, while there is no obligation to acquire the second sort.
Harrii v. Youngstown Bridge Co., supra note ii; Citizens' Savings & Trust Co. v. Dayton
Traction Co., supra note io.
'See Seavey, Notice Through an Agent (1916) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. I, 24; Note (1925)
io IowA L. B. 231, 233; Mechem, Notice to, or Knowledge of, an Agent (I908) 7 Micir. L.
REv. 113, 118 n. 25.

Several jurisdictions hold that an agent's knowledge is imputed to his principal if such
majority, however, charge the

knowledge is gained in the scope of his employment. The

principal with the knowledge of the agent even if it is acquired in a prior transaction, provided that such knowledge is present in the agent's mind during the present transaction.
See (1931) 79 U, OF PA. L. Rrv. 974.
'This rule arose accidentally while the court in Sooy v. State, infra note 3, at 4o was
trying to uphold the "identity" theory of imputed knowledge, i. e., that the principal is
chargeable with knowledge of the agent obtained in the scope of his employment.
'41 N. J. L. 394 (1879).
'Willard v. Denise, 5o N. J. Eq. 482, 26 At. 29 (1892).
'Deal v. Sieling, 1O2 N. J. L. 585, 133 At. 409 (1926)'; see Vulcan Detinning Co. v.
American Can Co., 72 N. J. Eq. 387, 401, 67 Atl. 339, 345 (I9o7); Lanning v. Johnson,
75 N. J. L. 259, 261, 69 Atl. 490, 491 (1908). In Hanford v. Duchastel, 87 N. J. L. 2o5, 93
At. 586 (I915), it is not clear whether the court applied the rule thiat knowledge is imputed
only when acquired while acting as agent or whether it adopted the peculiar New Jersey
rule.
'In 2 MEcHEm, AGENCY (2d ed., I914) § 1837, it is said: "Where the same person acts
with their consent, as agent of two or more principals, all interested in the same subject-matter, and concerning which he owes a duty of communication to each, notice to this agent must
doubtless be deemed notice to all his principals in accordance with the ordinary rules."
Accord: Holden v. New York & Erie Bank, 72 N. Y. 286 (1878) ; Pyeatt v. Estus, 72 Okla.
i6o, 179 Pac. 42 (1916) ; Blackwell v. Mortgage Co., 65 S. C. 1O5, 43 S. E. 395 (9o2) ; see
Note (i9o5) 6I CENT. L. J. 183, i85. But contra where the principals are not thus interested, or where there is no duty imposed upon the agent to communicate his knowledge to
the principal sought to be affected. In re Hampshire Land Co., 2 Ch. Div. 743 (1896) ;
Schuling v. Ervin, I85 Iowa I, 169 N. W. 686 (1918) ; In re Fenwick, i Ch. Div. 507 (I9o2).
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that would appear to make its decision conform to the rule which it presented,
the court, in effect, was applying the majority ruling 7 that a principal is chargeable with knowledge present in his agent's mind, even if it is acquired in a prior
transaction. Had another agent been employed it is very doubtful whether he
would have learned of the prior mortgage. The court went too far in asserting
that it was the duty of one employed to execute a mortgage not only to go to
the public records but also to get an affidavit from the mortgagor respecting
previous mortgages and liens." Actually, therefore, the principal is being imputed with knowledge gained in a previous transaction. The court might as
well have adopted the much simpler majority rule, rather than distort the
logically unsound New Jersey doctrine. It can be seen from its application
here that the court is allowed too much latitude in determining just what information the principal would have acquired. There is no doubt that a court
could stretch the rule to include knowledge that would be highly improbable
for the principal to obtain if he should negotiate personally or through another
agent.9

TORTS--PUBLIC OFFICERS-RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL
TENDENT OF BANKING FOR NEGLIGENCE-A stockholder

TO

SUE SUPERIN-

in an insolvent bank
brought an action against the superintendent of banks, on the ground that he
negligently performed some duties and wholly disregarded others. Held, that
the defendant, owing no duty to the plaintiff, was not liable. Walker et al. v.
Broderick, Superintendent of Banks, 252 N. Y. Supp. 559 (I93i).
It is sometimes said that public officers, whose duties are ministerial, are
liable to third parties for negligent performance thereof, while those whose
duties are discretionary are immune from responsibility." There is undoubtedly,

as the instant case recognizes, the more fundamental distinction, that a public
officer 2 as any other individual,' should not be responsible unless there is a
'Supra note i.
'While the court confidently speaks of the existence of such a custom, there does not
seem to have been introduced any evidence of this usage; nor has a somewhat casual investigation of the writer revealed that this is the practice in New Jersey.
Although the following cases do not directly hold that search need go no further than
the public records, nevertheless, since each case-nerely declares that search must be made
of the public records, and nothing is said of doing anything in addition, an inference might
268 (873) ; Jacobsen v. Peterson, 91 N. J.
be drawn to this effect. Chase v. Heaney, 70 Ill.
L. 4o4, 103 Atl. 983 (1918); Economy B. & L. Ass'n v. West Jersey Title Co., 64 N. J. L.
27, 44 Atl. 854 (1899). But see Humboldt Bldg. Ass'n v. Ducker's Adm'r, 26 Ky. L. Rep.
931, 82 S. W. 969 (1904) where it was held that the duty of an attorney, employed to examine the title to land with a view of placing a mortgage thereon, and knowing that a building
vias being erected on the premises, was to ascertain whether there were any liens for materials and labor furnished; and that mere searching the records was insufficient.
'The rules imputing to the principal knowledge actually received by the agent, whether
in the scope of his authority or whether acquired in a prior transaction, have at least the
advantage of simplicity. It ismerely necessary, under these theories, to procure evidence
as to what information the agent had. Under the New Jersey rule, however, the court is
left to the questionable method of speculating upon what knowledge the principal would

have acquired had he negotiated for himself or had employed another agent in the transaction.

'Wilson v. Mayor and City of New York, i Denio 595 (N. Y., 1845); Ham v. Los
Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 189 Pac. 462 (192o). In Hipp v. Farrell et al., 173 N. C.
167, 91 S. E. 831 (1917), the court qualifies this rule by saying that where the duty is ministerial, the officer must owe the duty to the individual suing in order to incur liability.

'Richardson v. Belknap, 73 Colo. 52, 213 Pac. 335 (1923) ; Eberhardt Const. Co. v.
Board of Com'rs of Sedgewick County, io6 Kan. 410, 186 Pac. 492 (192o) ; Strong v. Campbell, ii Barb. 135 (N. Y., 1851).
2

Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).

RECENT CASES

breach of duty owed to the party suing, as differentiated from a duty owed to
the public at large.4 The merits of the latter distinction are apparent when it is
considered that discretionary officers have been held liable in some situations,
while in other cases ministerial officers have been absolved from responsibility.8
Yet the type of duty must not be overlooked, for if it is discretionary it seems
inconsistent that a performance of it may be negligent. 7 The reason for requiring a duty to be owed to the particular individual suing is a practical one.
An extension of the ambit of responsibility to the point of permitting everyone
injured by certain conduct to bring suit" would subject the actor to such a
liability that there would be a premium on inaction. This is especially manifest
in the principal case since a person would be extremely hesitant in accepting
this public position 9 which would involve the risk of financial ruin. And even
if he did accept, the efficient performance of the increasingly important duties
involved would be interfered with by the constant fear of personal liability and
consequent insolvency.' 0 The conclusion of the principal case is, therefore,
correct 11 since the interest in maintaining capable men in office outweighs the
interest in permitting a comparatively few individuals to recover. 2

TRUSTS-STATUTORY EXEMPTION OF TRUST ESTATE FROM LIABILITY FOR

DEBTS OF CESTUI QUE TRUST-A trust created by defendant's mother provided
that he be paid a share of the income on certain realty for fifteen years, and
should then take title to the property as tenant in common with other beneficiaries.
A statute' provided that property held in trust for a debtor should be exempt
from attachment by his creditors, where the trust was created by a person other
than the debtor. Plaintiff sought to subject defendant's interest to satisfaction
'Since a public officer is an agent of the state a proper analogy may be drawn to agency
law, where a third person cannot recover from the agent for a breach of duty owed to the
principal. Denny v. Manhattan Co., 2 Denio 115 (N. Y., i846) ; (1918) 31 HARv. L. REV.
i036. It is true that in the instant case the principal is the state, yet the state is no more
the people individually than a corporation is its stockholders. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43,
26 Sup. Ct. 370 (i9o6). And it is a well established principle of law that an individual
cannot sue on a right of action accruing to the corporation. BALLENTINE, MANUAL OF CORroRa&rio LAW AND PRA cMcE (1930) 23.
. E. F. Gaylor et at. v. David Hunt et al., 23 Ohio St. 25.5 (1872) (a member of the
judiciary was held liable for ministerial acts) ; (1920) 34 HAav. L. REv. 219; (0920) 4 MINN.

L. REV. 303.
I People v. Hoag, 54 Colo. 542, 131 Pac. 400 (I913). Here a town clerk, whose ministerial duty was to print in a newspaper a list of nominees was held not to be liable to the
only newspaper of the district for failure so to do, since the duty was owed to the public at
large and not to the newspaper company.
7
CooLEY, Toars (3d ed. i9o6) 753.
Where the superintendent of banking is guilty of gross abuse of discretion or fraud it
is said that he would be personally liable. See State v. American Surety Co., 26 Idaho 652,
r45 Pac. 1097 (i914) ; Yeargin et al. v. Shull, State Bank Com'r, 300 Pac. 3o3 (Okla., 193i);
(I918) 3 HAv. L. REv. 1036.
'The duties of the Superintendent of Banks is generally discretionary. See N. Y. CoNs.
LAWs (Cahill, 193o) c. 3 art. 2.
11Hicks v, Davis, ioo Kan. 4, 163 Pac. 799 (917)
; Yealy et al. v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212

(1862).
I State ex rel. Funk v. Turner et al., 17 S. W. (2d) 986 (Mo.,

1028) ; State v. American Surety Co., supra note 8; Sanders State Bank v. Hawkins, 142 S. W. 84 (Tex., 1911).
I Sanders State Bank v. Hawkins, supra note ii.

'WAsl.

ComP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 637.
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of a judgment. Held, that the plaintiff could not reach defendant's interest in
corpus or income.

Knettle v. Knettle, 3 P. (2d)

133 (Wash. 1931).

At common law, judgment creditors of the cestui que trust may subject his
equitable estate to the satisfaction of their claims by a bill in equity,2 and in
many states, by statute, a similar remedy may be obtained at law.' While it is
true that the majority of American states have created a notable exception to

this rule by their recognition of the spendthrift trust,4 the result achieved in

the instant decision is frowned upon even in those jurisdictions, since it exempts
the beneficiary's interest from attachment by his creditors where the settlor
expressed no such intention, and where no restrictions were imposed upon the
beneficiary's power of alienation. 5 It is doubtful that the legislature intended
to make every trust created by a third party, in effect, a spendthrift trust, unless
it be assumed that the statute, by shielding the interest of the beneficiary from
attachment, was also intended to restrict his power to alienate it, or to create the
presumption that this was the intent of the settlor.6 Since the statute does not
expressly exempt the equitable interest of the beneficiary, but merely protects
the "money, thing in action, or other property" held in trust for the debtor, it
is possible to assume that the legislature intended merely to prevent the termination of a trust created by a third party, prior to the expiration of the trust
period, by the attachment and sale of the corpus, which the debtor himself
could not reach. 7 This construction would avoid the injustice of the instant
decision, which, although consistent with those in a few states with similar
'First National Bank v. Dougan, 25o Fed. 510 (S. D. Ga., 1918) ; Coyne v. Plume, go
Conn. 293, 07 Ati. 337 (1916) ; Hooberry v. Harding, 10 Lea 392 (Tenn., 1883): GLENN,
RIGHTS & REMiEDIES OF CREDITORS (1915) § 25; TRUSTS, RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. I93I)
§ 149.

'Humphrey v. Gerard, 83 Conn. 346, 77 Atl. 65 (i91O) ; Marshall's Trustee v. Rash,
87 Ky. II6, 7 S. W. 879 (1888); GLENN, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 9; Scott, Control of Property by the Dead (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 527, 632, 644.
'Broadway National Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882) ; Jourolman v. Massengill,
86 Tenn. 81, 5 S. W. 719 (1887); White v. O'Bryan, 148 Tenn. 18, 251 S. W. 785 (1922)
(language excluding creditors unnecessary if beneficiary is denied power of alienation);
PERRY, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES (7th ed., 1929) § 386a; TRUSTS RESTATEIIENT § 148 (C) ; Note
(1926) 74 U. OF P. L. REV. 496; (1916) 64 U. OF PA. L. REv. 643.
At common law, a settlor may not validly exempt the beneficiary's interest from liability for the latter's debts unless he restricts, expressly or impliedly, the power of alienation. Gray v. Obear, 54 Ga. 232 (875) ; Ullman v. Cameron, I86 N. Y. 339, 78 N. E. 2o74
(I9O7) ; Mebane v. Mebane, 4 Ired. Eq. 131 N. C. 1845) ; Morgan's Estate (No. 1), 223
Pa. 228, 72 Atl. 498 (19o9); see Hopkinson v. Swaim, 284 IIl. 11, 23, 2i9 N. E. 985, 989
(I928). Contra: Boston Safe Deposit Co. v. Luke, 22o Mass. 484, lo8 N. E. 64 (915) ; cf.
Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Rawle 33 (Pa., 1829).
6 See Mr. Justice Holmes discussion of Boston Safe Deposit Co. v. Luke, supra note
5 (holding that the exclusion of the beneficiary's creditors did not affect the assignability
of his interest), in Eaton v. Boston Trust Co., 24o U. S. 427, 36 Sup. Ct. 391 (i916). In
Binns v. LaForge, 191 Ill. 598, 6i N. E. 382 (I9OI), the court, interpreting a statute similar
to the one governing the instant decision, said, obiter, that a voluntary assignment by the
beneficiary of such trust would not be void under the section. The question is unlikely to
arise in New York, where the assignability of trust interests is greatly restricted by the
property laws.
7The majority of American jurisdictions, following Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. i9,
2o N. E. 454 (1889), hold that an active trust cannot be terminated by the beneficiary prior
to the fulfillment of the purposes for which the trust was created. PERRY, op. cit. supra
note 4, at § 92o, et seq.; Evans, Termination of Trusts (928) 37 YALE L. J. 2O7O. It follows, therefore, that the creditor, as an involuntary assignee of the beneficiary, should have
no greater right to terminate the trust by execution upon the corpus. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Washington legislature intended to deny the creditor attachment of
the corpus, the legal title to which is in the trustee, without prejudicing his common law
right to reach the equitable estate of the beneficiary.

RECENT CASES
statutes, 8 paradoxically denies creditors the right to attach an interest which
their debtor might validly assign.9

WILLS-DESTRUCTION OF A REVOKING WILL-REPUBLICATION BY A
CODICIL WITNESSED BY TRUSTEES OF A CHARITABLE BEQUEsT-Testator executed a will containing charitable bequests, which, in accordance with a
statute I was witnessed by two disinterested parties. He later executed another
will which expressly revoked the prior will. Subsequently he destroyed the
second will, and executed a codicil to the first will, witnessed by officers of the
trust company which was trustee of the charitable bequests, in which he declared
that the first will was thereby republished. Held, that the charitable bequests
are valid because there was no written evidence of a revocation of the first will,
and that the codicil had no effect onf the first will even though it may have been
improperly witnessed. In re Shetter's Estate, 303 Pa. 193, 154 Atl. 288 (1931).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently decided in Ford's Estate 2 that
a revocation clause in a subsequent will is an absolute and immediate revocation
of all prior wills.3 There was such a revocation in the instant case, but the
court treated it as an oral revocation since it had been destroyed. In jurisdictions which treat a revocation clause as an immediate revocation, all that need
be proved is existence of the will at some time or other.4 It therefore is obvious
that an oral revocation is by no means the same as oral proof of the existence
of a written revocation. 5 Since there was in reality a revocation in the instant
case, the decision can be consistent with the doctrine of the Ford case only if
there was a revival or a republication. The Ford case 6 cited with approval the
rule that a simple destruction of a second will cannot reinstate a former one
unless it were -accompanied by dircumstances showing an intention on the part
of the testator to effect such a revival.7 Such circumstances do not appear in
'Binns v. LaForge, supra note 6; Hardenburgh v. Blair, 3o N. J. Eq. 645 (1879) ; Campbell v. Foster, 35"N. Y. 361 (1866). An interesting analogy can be drawn from these cases
to the statutory exemption of homesteads, necessary tools, and funds essential for snstenance
from execution by creditors. See WArr, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES & CR'VITOR'S BILLs
(3d ed. 1897) §.36s.
'Since the Washington Code has superseded the common law, rherging law and equity,
it may be contended that the court in the instant case was governed solely by the Code, and
that it is fallacious to judge the correctness of its decision by reference to equitable principles. Although there is some force to this contention, it may well be said that "Whatever
modifications have been introduced by statute into the forms of relief, the system of justice
which is administered in courts of equity must, of necessity, enter into the laws of every
civilized state whose institutions are derived, directly or indirectly, from England . ..
BISPHAm, EQUITY (Ioth ed. 1922) § 15. And in many instances, these statutes merely en-

deavor to codify the existing common law.
1 1917 P. L. 403, § 6 PA. STAT. (West,

'3oi

Pa. 183, 151 Atl. 789 (1930).

192o) § 8312.

'For a well-considered article on that case, see Note (193) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 325.
Also discussed in Note (i93i)- 26 ILL. L. REv. 352.
' Kern v. Kern, 154 Ind. 29, 55 N. E. 1oo4 (19oo) ; Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94
N. W. 705 (1903); Brackenridge v. Roberts, 114 Tex. 418, 267 S. W. 244 (1924); cf.
Deaves's Estate, i4o Pa. 242, 21 Ati. 395 (1891) ; Ticknor's Estate, Singer, Prob. Cas. 225

(Pa. 1903) (lost will was proved orally for the purpose of showing that a prior will was
thereby revoked).
The principle that secondary evidence is admissible when primary evidence has been
lost or destroyed is well established in other fields of the law, as in the case of deeds and
negotiable instruments. Gorgas v. Hertz, IO Pa. 538, 24 Atl. 786 (1892); Smith v. Sayre
Nat. Bank, 59 Pa. Sup. 272 (1914).
'Supra note 2, at 197, 151 Atl. at 794.
See dissenting opinion by Moschzisker, C. J., supra note 2, at 199, 151 Atl: at 798. For
a discussion of the accuracy of considering the testator's intent, see Roberts, Revival of a
Prior Will by Revocation of a Later Will (19oo) 48 Ami. L. REFG. 505.
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the instant case, and consequently that rule can have no application. There
remains, however, the possibility of republication by the codicil. It is a generally accepted doctrine that a, codicil cannot operate as a republication of a
revoked will unless that codicil is valid and probatable 8 A trustee of a charitable bequest has been held to be a "disinterested witness" 9 under the statute.10
Furthermore, the fact that a subscribing witness was n6 t disinterested under the
statute would not affect the probate of the will, but only the subsequent distribution of the estate.11 Therefore the result of the instant case is correct, since
the codicil was properly effective as a republication of the original will.
For a citation of American statutes on the question of revival, see Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills (1928) 14 IOWA L. REv. I, 172, 283, 428 (none of these statutes provide
for revival by an invalid codicil).
8 1 PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) sog ("An improperly executed codicil does not republish a will.") ; Love v. Johnston, 34 N. C. 355 (i85o) ; In re Leech's Estate, 236 Pa. 57, 84
At. 594 (1912).
'In ie Baughman's Estate, 281 Pa. 23, 126 Atl. 58 (1924).
"Supra note 6. This statute provides that the interest which will affect a witness's
capacity must be in the nature of a direct property right in the testamentary fund, or such
immediate connection with the legatee as leads to the inevitable conclusion that the witness
will pecuniarily profit by the legacy.
Quinn's Estate, 2 D. & C. 518 (Pa. 1922).

